

117TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 6953

To prohibit the importation of crude oil and petroleum products from the Russian Federation, to impose sanctions with respect to persons involved in the importation of such crude oil and petroleum products who have engaged in acts of corruption or who are responsible for serious human rights abuses, and for other purposes.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 7, 2022

Mr. KHANNA (for himself and Ms. MACE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Ways and Means, Oversight and Reform, Financial Services, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

---

## A BILL

To prohibit the importation of crude oil and petroleum products from the Russian Federation, to impose sanctions with respect to persons involved in the importation of such crude oil and petroleum products who have engaged in acts of corruption or who are responsible for serious human rights abuses, and for other purposes.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1     **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2         This Act may be cited as the “Severing Putin’s Im-  
3         mense Gains from Oil Transfers Act of 2022” or the  
4         “SPIGOT Act of 2022”.

5     **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

6         Congress makes the following findings:

7             (1) In February 2022, the Russian Federation  
8         launched a large scale invasion of Ukraine that vio-  
9         lated Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

10            (2) In 2021, the Russian Federation became  
11         the second-largest exporter of crude oil and petro-  
12         leum products to the United States, after Canada.

13            (3) In 2020, 7 percent of all petroleum imports  
14         to the United States came from the Russian Federa-  
15         tion, which is more than was imported from the  
16         Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

17            (4) The United States private sector imported  
18         848,000 barrels of oil from the Russian Federation  
19         per day in June 2021.

20            (5) From January through December 2021, the  
21         United States imported 245,194,000 barrels of oil  
22         from the Russian Federation, which at an annual  
23         average of \$71 per barrel equals approximately  
24         \$17,400,000,000 in oil imports.

25            (6) As of February 2022, oil prices have risen  
26         to \$92 per barrel.

1                         (7) According to the Ministry of Finance of the  
2 Russian Federation, 36 percent of all revenue of the  
3 Government of the Russian Federation came from  
4 the oil and gas sector in 2021. In 2019 and 2020,  
5 the overall percentage of revenue of that Govern-  
6 ment that came from the oil and gas sector reached  
7 39 and 28 percent, respectively.

8                         (8) The President of the Russian Federation,  
9 Vladimir Putin, relies on a network of government  
10 officials, heads of state-owned enterprises, and busi-  
11 ness leaders to maintain his grasp on power.

12                         (9) Russian-owned energy entities that have ties  
13 to individuals aligned with Putin see benefits from  
14 reliance by the United States on imports of crude oil  
15 and petroleum products from the Russian Federa-  
16 tion.

17                         (10) In early 2021, political prisoner Alexei  
18 Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation outlined  
19 some of the corrupt linkages between Russian oil  
20 giant Rosneft, with key Putin ally Igor Sechin as its  
21 head, and Vladimir Putin himself.

22                         (11) The United States Government has al-  
23 ready taken action against individuals with links to  
24 the energy sector of the Russian Federation, such as  
25 Igor Sechin, Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, Kirill

1       Shamalov, Viktor Vekselberg, and Sergey Frusenko,  
2       under—

3                     (A) the Global Magnitsky Human Rights  
4                     Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of  
5                     Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note);

6                     (B) Executive Orders 13661 and 13662  
7                     (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking  
8                     property of additional persons contributing to  
9                     the situation in Ukraine), codified by section  
10                    222 of the Countering America’s Adversaries  
11                    Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9522); and

12                    (C) Executive Order 13582 (50 U.S.C.  
13                    1701 note; relating to blocking property of the  
14                    Government of Syria and prohibiting certain  
15                    transactions with respect to Syria).

16                    (12) While sanctions imposed by the United  
17                    States in response to the Russian Federation’s war  
18                    of aggression against Ukraine have largely exempted  
19                    the energy sector, on February 24, 2022, the United  
20                    States Government announced action against the fol-  
21                    lowing 2 additional individuals with links to that sec-  
22                    tor:

23                    (A) Ivan Sechin, son of Igor Sechin, and  
24                    reportedly a deputy head of a department at  
25                    Rosneft.

(B) Andrey Patrushev, a leader of Gazprom Neft, and son of Nikolai Platonovich Patrushev, the Secretary of the Russian Security Council.

12                   (14) Oil imported from the Russian Federation  
13                   contributes to the overall United States carbon foot-  
14                   print, which makes up nearly 15 percent of all global  
15                   greenhouse gas emissions.

1 than 1,700 military installations continue to be  
2 threatened by sea-level rise. Extreme weather events  
3 have caused more than \$796,100,000,000 in damage  
4 in the United States during the 5 years before the  
5 date of the enactment of this Act alone.

6 (17) President Biden has set an economy-wide  
7 target for the United States to reduce its net green-  
8 house gas emissions by 50 to 52 percent below 2005  
9 levels by 2030, which will require decarbonization in  
10 the energy, buildings, and transportation sectors.

11 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

12 It is a sense of Congress that—

13 (1) the reliance of the United States on oil im-  
14 ported from the Russian Federation presents a na-  
15 tional security liability;

16 (2) a prohibition on imports of oil from the  
17 Russian Federation could deprive the Russian Fed-  
18 eration upwards of \$20,000,000,000 or more rev-  
19 enue from the United States in 2022;

20 (3) Russian energy entities are controlled by  
21 Russian executives and oligarchs with close ties to  
22 Vladimir Putin, and profits from the energy sector  
23 may be implicated in corruption and in fueling  
24 human rights abuses globally and in the Russian  
25 Federation;

1                   (4) the United States Government must—

11 (C) invest in renewable energy alternatives  
12 to replace foreign carbon-intensive energy im-  
13 ports; and

14                         (5) actively decarbonizing the United States en-  
15                         ergy economy is of vital strategic interest to the na-  
16                         tional security and climate change reduction targets  
17                         of the United States.

18 SEC. 4. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-  
19 FINED.

20 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
21 mittees” means—

5 SEC. 5. REPORT ON LINKS BETWEEN RUSSIAN ENERGY EN-  
6 TITIES, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND  
7 CORRUPTION.

8       (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
9 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,  
10 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary  
11 of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary  
12 of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director  
13 of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate  
14 congressional committees a report—

23 (3) identifying whether any individuals de-  
24 scribed in paragraph (2) or entities described in  
25 paragraph (1) have engaged in acts of corruption or

1       are responsible for or complicit in, or have directly  
2       or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights  
3       abuses;

4                 (4) identifying the ways in which revenue gen-  
5       erated from the exportation of crude oil and petro-  
6       leum products to the United States and to other  
7       countries has helped insulate the Russian economy  
8       since the United States and international community  
9       imposed sanctions in response to the Russian Fed-  
10      eration's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine;

11                (5) identifying alternative suppliers for the im-  
12      portation of crude oil and petroleum products, other  
13      than from the Russian Federation, that minimize  
14      risks to United States consumers;

15                (6) a comprehensive strategy to prioritize car-  
16      bon-free energy sources and reduction of the demand  
17      for fossil energy as alternatives to crude oil and pe-  
18      troleum products imported from the Russian Fed-  
19      eration; and

20                (7) assessing why United States entities are  
21      choosing to do business with entities described in  
22      paragraph (1) and what advantages doing business  
23      with such entities presents.

1       (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-  
2 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may  
3 include a classified annex.

**4 SEC. 6. PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF CRUDE OIL AND**

**5 PETROLEUM PRODUCTS FROM THE RUSSIAN**

**6 FEDERATION.**

7       (a) IN GENERAL.—Effective on the date that is 30  
8 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the im-  
9 portation of crude oil and petroleum products from the  
10 Russian Federation into the United States is prohibited.

11 (b) PRESIDENTIAL WAIVER.—

6                             (2) RENEWAL.—The President may renew a  
7 waiver issued under paragraph (1) on annual basis  
8 if, before the termination date of the previous waiver—  
9

## **20 SEC. 7. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.**

21       (a) IN GENERAL.—Upon receiving a report required  
22 by section 5, the President shall use the authorities pro-  
23 vided by the provisions of law specified in subsection (b)  
24 to impose sanctions with respect to any foreign individual  
25 or entity identified under section 5(a)(3) as having en-

1 gaged in acts of corruption or who are responsible for or  
2 complicit in, or have directly or indirectly engaged in, seri-  
3 ous human rights abuses.

4 (b) PROVISIONS OF LAW SPECIFIED.—The provisions  
5 of law specified in this subsection are the following:

6 (1) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Ac-  
7 countability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public  
8 Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

9 (2) The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Ac-  
10 countability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law  
11 112–208; 22 U.S.C. 5811 note).

12 (3) Title II of the Countering America’s Adver-  
13 saries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9501 et  
14 seq.).

15 (4) The International Emergency Economic  
16 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).

